Deep learning based visual sensing has achieved a ractive accuracy but is shown vulnerable to adversarial example a acks. Specically, once the a ackers obtain the deep model, they can construct adversarial examples to mislead the model to yield wrong classication results. Deployable adversarial examples such as small stickers pasted on the road signs and lanes have been shown effective in misleading advanced driver-assistance systems. Many existing countermeasures against adversarial examples build their security on the a ackers' ignorance of the defense mechanisms. us, they fall short of following Kerckho s's principle and can be subverted once the a ackers know the details of the defense. is paper applies the strategy of moving target defense (MTD) to generate multiple new deep models a er system deployment, that will collaboratively detect and thwart adversarial examples. Our MTD design is based on the adversarial examples' minor transferability to models di ering from the one (e.g., the factory-designed model) used for a ack construction.
INTRODUCTION
To implement autonomous systems operating in complex environments (e.g., the long envisaged self-driving cars), the accurate and resilient perception of the environment is o en the most challenging step in the closed loop of sensing, decision, and actuation. e recent advances of deep learning [31, 37] have triggered great interests of applying it to address the environment perception challenges. For instance, deep learning-based computer vision techniques have been increasingly adopted on commercial o -the-shelf advanced driver-assistance systems (ADAS) [29, 36] .
However, recent studies show that deep models (e.g., multilayer perceptrons and convolutional neural networks) are vulnerable to adversarial examples, which are inputs formed by applying small but cra ed perturbations to the clean examples in order to make the victim deep model yield wrong classi cation results. is vulnerability is a ributed to the linear nature of the deep models [24] .
Systematic approaches have been developed to generate adversarial examples as long as the a ackers acquire the deep model, where the a ackers may know the internals of the model [24] or not [50] . Certain constraints can be considered in the generation process when the a ackers cannot tamper with every pixel of the input. For example, in [21] , an algorithm is developed to determine adversarial stickers that can be implemented by physically pasting small paper stickers on road signs to mislead vision-based sign classi er. Moreover, as demonstrated in [64] and explained in [63] , the vision-based lane detector of Tesla Autopilot, which is an ADAS, can be fooled by small adversarial stickers on the road and thus direct the car to the opposite lane, creating life-threatening danger. Autopilot's weather condition classi er is also shown vulnerable to adversarial examples, leading to wrong operations of the windshield wiper.
erefore, adversarial examples present an immediate and real threat to deep visual sensing systems. e design of these systems must incorporate e ective countermeasures especially under the safety-critical se ings.
Existing countermeasures aim at hardening the deep models through adversarial training [24, 33, 43] , adding a data transformation layer [6, 14, 15, 19, 26, 42, 68, 71, 73] , and gradient masking [9, 52, 55, 59] .
ese countermeasures are o en designed to address certain adversarial examples and build their security on the a ackers' ignorance of the defense mechanisms, e.g., the adversarial example generation algorithms used in adversarial training, the data transformation algorithms, and the gradient masking approaches. us, they do not address adaptive a ackers and fall short of following Kerckho s's principle in designing secure systems (i.e., the enemy knows the system except for the secret key [58] ). Once the a ackers acquire the hardened model and the details of the defense mechanisms, they can cra the next-generation adversarial examples to render the hardened model vulnerable again [3, 10] .
At present, the deep model training still requires considerable expertise and extensive ne-tuning. As such, in the current practice, a factory-designed deep model is o en massively deployed to the products and remains static until the next so ware upgrade. Such a deployment manner grants the a ackers advantage of time. ey can extract the deep model (which may be much hardened by the existing countermeasures) from the so ware release or the memory of a purchased product, study it, and construct the next-generation adversarial examples to a ect all products using the same deep model.
Beyond the static defense, in this paper, we consider a moving target defense (MTD) strategy [32] to generate one or more new deep models a er system deployment that the a ackers can hardly acquire. Di erent from the identical and static deep model that results in a single point of failure, the generated post-deployment models are distinct across the systems. is approach invalidates an essential basis for the a ackers to construct e ective adversarial examples, i.e., the acquisition of the deep model. Taking the deep visual sensing of ADAS as an example, under the MTD strategy, new deep models can be continually trained when the computing unit of a car is idle. Once the training completes with the validation accuracy meeting the manufacturer-speci ed requirement, the new deep models can be commissioned to replace the in-service models that were previously generated on the car. By bootstrapping the in situ training with randomness, it will be practically di cult for the a ackers to acquire the in-service deep models, which thus can be viewed as the secret of the system. With MTD, the adversarial examples constructed based on a stolen deep model are neither e ective across many systems nor e ective against a single victim system over a long period of time. In particular, extracting the private deep models from a victim system will require physical access. If the a ackers have such physical access, they should launch the more direct and devastating physical a acks that are out of the scope of this paper.
In this paper, we design an MTD approach for embedded deep visual sensing systems that are susceptible to adversarial examples, such as ADAS [7, 20] and biometric authentication [27] . Several challenges need to be addressed. First, adversarial examples have non-negligible transferability to new deep models [24, 40, 49, 62] . From our extensive evaluation based on several datasets, although a new deep model can largely thwart the adversarial examples constructed based on a static base model, the adversarial examples can still mislead the new deep models with a probability from 7% to 17%. Second, the primitive MTD design of using a single new deep model does not give awareness of the presence of adversarial examples, thus losing the opportunities of involving the human to improve the safety of the system. Note that human can be considered immune to adversarial examples due to their design principle of perturbation minimization. ird, in situ training of the new deep models without resorting to the cloud is desirable given the concerns of eavesdropping and tampering during the communications over the Internet. However, the training may incur signi cant computational overhead for the embedded systems.
To collectively address the above challenges, we propose a fork MTD (fMTD) approach based on three key observations on the responses of new deep models to the adversarial examples constructed using the base model. First, the output of a new deep model that is successfully misled by an adversarial example tends to be unpredictable, even though the adversarial example is constructed toward a target label [40] . Second, from the minor transferability of adversarial examples and the unpredictability of the misled new model's output, if we use su ciently many distinct new models to classify an adversarial example, a majority of them will give the correct classi cation result while the inconsistency of all the models' outputs (due to the unpredictability) signals the presence of a ack. is multi-model design echos ensemble machine learning [16] . ird, compared with training a new deep model from scratch, the training with a perturbed version of the base model as the starting point can converge up to 4x faster, imposing less computation burden.
Based on the above observations, we design the fMTD approach as follows. When the system has idle computing resources, it adds independent perturbations to the parameters of the base model to generate multiple fork models.
e base model can be a well factory-designed deep model that gives certi ed accuracy for clean examples, but may be acquired by the a ackers. Each fork model is then used as the starting point of a retraining process. e retrained fork models are then commissioned for the visual sensing task. As the fork models are retrained from the base model, intuitively, they will inherit much of the classi cation capability of the base model for clean examples. At run time, an input, which may be an adversarial example constructed based on the base model, is fed into each fork model. If the degree of inconsistency among the fork models' outputs exceeds a prede ned level, the input is detected as an adversarial example. e majority of the fork models' outputs is yielded as the nal result of the sensing task. If the system operates in the human-in-the-loop mode, the human will be requested to classify detected adversarial examples.
e run-time inference overhead of fMTD is proportional to the number of fork models used. Based on our performance proling on NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier, which is a GPU-equipped embedded computing board, instructing TensorFlow to execute the fork models at the same time brings limited bene t in shortening inference time. In contrast, the serial execution of them admits an early stopping mechanism inspired by the serial signal detection [53] . Speci cally, the system runs the fork models in serial and terminates the execution once su cient con dence is accumulated to decide the cleanness of the input. Evaluation results show that the serial fMTD reduces the inference time by a factor of up to 5 while achieving the similar sensing and defense performance compared with instructing TensorFlow to execute all fork models. e contributions of this paper are summarized as follows:
• Based on important observations on the responses of deep models to adversarial examples, we design fMTD to counteract adversarial example a acks as an ongoing concern.
• We conduct extensive evaluation on fMTD's accuracy in classifying clean examples as well as its performance in detecting and thwarting adversarial examples under a wide range of se ings. e results provide key guidelines for adopters of fMTD in speci c applications.
• We show that the serial execution of the fork models with early stopping can signi cantly reduce the inference time of fMTD while maintaining the sensing accuracy in both the absence and presence of a acks.
e reminder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 reviews background and related work. §3 presents a measurement study to motivate the fMTD design. §4 designs fMTD. §5 evaluates the accuracy and a ack detection performance of fMTD. §6 pro les fMTD on Jetson and evaluates the serial fMTD. §7 discusses several issues not addressed in this paper. §8 concludes this paper.
BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 2.1 Adversarial Examples and Construction
Adversarial examples are intentionally designed inputs to mislead deep models to produce incorrect results. Let f θ (x) denote a classi er, where θ is the classi er's parameter and x ∈ [0, 1] m is the input (e.g., an image). Let denote the ground truth label of x. e
. e δ is the perturbation designed by the a ackers. A targeted adversarial example x makes f θ (x ) = t , where t is a speci ed target label. A non-targeted adversarial example ensures that the classication result f θ (x ) is an arbitrary label other than the ground truth label . If the a ackers need no knowledge of the classi er's internals (e.g., architecture, hyperparameters, and parameters) to construct the adversarial example, the a ack is called black-box a ack. Otherwise, it is called white-box a ack. In this work, we consider both targeted and non-targeted adversarial examples. As the objective of this paper is to develop a defense approach, it is bene cial to consider the stronger white-box a ack, in which the a ackers have the knowledge of the internals of the base model.
To increase the stealthiness of the a ack to human perception, the di erence between x and x , denoted by D(x, x ), is to be minimized. us, the construction of the perturbation for a targeted adversarial example, denoted by δ * t , can be formulated as a constrained optimization problem [62] 
e targeted adversarial example that gives the minimum D(x, x ) can be yielded as a nontargeted adversarial example.
Various gradient-based approaches have been proposed to solve the above constrained optimization problem [4, 12, 13, 24, 35, 45, 46, 51, 56, 61, 62] . Among them, the approach proposed by Carlini and Wagner (C&W) [12] is o en thought to be a highly e ective a ack construction method and used to evaluate various defense approaches [1] . We brie y introduce it here. C&W's approach instantiates the distance to be p -norm and apply Lagrangian relaxation to simplify the problem as: δ * t = argmin δ δ p + c · (x ), subject to x ∈ [0, 1] m , where the regularization function (·) encompasses the deep model f θ (·) and satis es (x ) ≥ 0 if and only if f θ (x ) = t . e empirical study in [12] shows that the following regularization leads to the most e ective a acks in general:
represents so max and κ is a parameter controlling the strength of the constructed adversarial example. at is, with a larger κ, the x is more likely classi ed as t . However, the perturbation (or distortion) δ will be larger. In the inner loop of C&W's a ack construction algorithm for a certain weight c, gradient descent is used to solve the constrained optimization problem. us, since C&W's approach exploits the gradients of f θ (·), it is a gradient-based approach. In the outer loop of the algorithm, binary search is applied to nd a se ing for c that further minimizes the objective function. In this paper, we use C&W's approach to generate adversarial examples and evaluate our fMTD design. Note that the design of fMTD does not rely on any speci cs of the C&W's approach.
Countermeasures to Adversarial Examples
Over ed models are o en thought highly vulnerable to adversarial example a acks. However, regularization approaches for preventing over ing, such as dropout and weight decay, are shown ine ective in precluding adversarial examples [24, 62] . Brute-force adversarial training [24, 33, 43] can improve a deep model to be immune to prede ned adversarial examples. However, it can be defeated by the adversarial examples that are not considered during the adversarial training. A range of other defense approaches apply various transformations to the input during both the training and inference phases. e transformations include compression [6, 14, 15, 19, 26] , cropping and foveation [26, 42] , data randomization [71] , and data augmentation [73] . ese approaches o en lead to accuracy drops on clean examples [72] and are only e ective against the adversarial examples constructed based on the deep model but without the knowledge of the transformation. Gradient masking is another category of defense against the adversarial examples constructed using gradient-based methods [9, 52, 55, 59] . It a empts to deny adversary access to useful gradients for constructing a ack. However, as shown in [3] , if the a ackers know the details of the transformation or the gradient masking, they can still construct e ective adversarial examples to ght back. Provable defense [18, 54, 70] gives lower bounds of the defense robustness. However, a key limitation of provable defense is that the lower bound is applicable for a set of speci c adversarial examples only.
As pointed out by [10] , a main drawback of most existing a ack prevention and thwarting approaches against adversarial examples is that they do not consider adaptive a ackers. Once the a ackers acquire the details of the defense, the a ackers can bypass the defense. In other words, these approaches' e ectiveness is contingent on the a acker's ignorance of the defense mechanism.
In addition to a ack prevention and thwarting, adversarial example detection has also received research. For example, a second classi er can be built to classify an input as clean or adversarial [23, 41, 44] . Statistical properties of the inputs such principle component have been used to detect a acks [5, 30, 39] . Others resort to statistical testing [22, 25] . However, these approaches cannot detect cra y a acks such as the C&W's a ack [11] .
Moving Target Defense
Static defense grants a ackers the advantage of time. MTD is an emerging approach to address this issue and increase the barrier for e ective a acks [32] . For instance, the computer hosts can mutate their IP addresses such that the a ack tra c is directed to wrong destinations [2] . In the approach described in [57] , a deep model is randomly selected from a set of candidate models each time to classify an input. e approach uses a limited number of candidate models (e.g., 3 to 6 [57] ) and assumes that they are known to the a ackers. Its e ectiveness of thwarting the a acks is merely based on the a ackers' ignorance of which model is being used, thus following a weak form of MTD. Given the limited number of candidate models, it is not impossible for the a ackers to construct an adversarial example that can mislead all candidate models. Moreover, the approach [57] is short of a ack detection capability since a single model is used each time. In contrast, fMTD applies an ensemble of locally generated deep models that can proliferate within the system's available computation resources to achieve both a ack detection and thwarting capabilities, thus constituting a strong form of MTD.
MEASUREMENT STUDY
We conduct measurements to gain insights for MTD design.
Used Datasets and Deep Models
We rst introduce the datasets and the deep models used in this measurement study as well as the extensive performance evaluation for fMTD in §5. We use the following three datasets:
is a dataset consisting of 60,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples. Each sample is a 28 × 28 grayscale image showing a handwri en digit from 0 to 9. We select 5,000 training samples as the validation dataset.
• CIFAR-10 [34] is a 10-class dataset consisting of 50,000 training samples and 10,000 test samples. Each sample is a 32 × 32 RGB color image. e 10 classes are airplanes, cars, birds, cats, deers, dogs, frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. We select 5,000 training samples as the validation dataset.
is a 43-class dataset with more than 50,000 images sizing from 15 × 15 to 250 × 250 pixels. For convenience, we resize all the images to 32 × 32 pixels by interpolation or downsampling. We divide them into training, validation, and test datasets with 34799, 4410, and 12630 samples, respectively.
We adopt two convolutional neural network (CNN) architectures that have been used in [12] and [52] . Table 1 illustrates the two architectures that are referred to as CNN-A and CNN-B; Table 2 shows the training hyperparameters. We apply CNN-A to MNIST. CNN-A has two convolutional layers with 32 3 × 3 lters followed by a max pooling layer, two convolutional layers with 64 3×3 lters followed by a max pooling layer, two fully connected layers with 200 recti ed linear units (ReLUs) each, and a 10-class so max layer. CNN-A is trained on MNIST using the momentum-based stochastic gradient descent. CNN-A achieves training and validation accuracy of 99.84% and 99.44%, respectively.
We apply CNN-B to CIFAR-10 and GTSRB. CNN-B's main difference from CNN-A is that more convolutional lters and more ReLUs in the fully connected layers are used to address the more complex pa erns of the CIFAR-10 and GTSRB images. Its so max layer has 10 or 43 classes for CIFAR-10 and GTSRB, respectively. CNN-B is trained with a learning rate of 0.01 (decay of 0.5 every 10 epochs) and a momentum rate of 0.9 (decay of 0.5 every 10 epochs). For CIFAR-10, CNN-B achieves a validation accuracy of 79.62%.
is result is consistent with those obtained in [12] and [52] . For GTSRB, CNN-B achieves training and validation accuracy of 99.93% and 96.64%, respectively.
e MNIST and CIFAR-10 datasets have been widely used in image recognition and machine learning research. e use of these two datasets allows us to adopt the CNN architectures that have been shown suitable for them. From the achieved training and validation accuracy, MNIST and CIFAR-10 are representatives of data with simple and complex pa erns, respectively. GTSRB gives realism since road sign recognition must be part of ADAS's visual sensing. However, this study does not cater to any speci c application. While the detailed results (e.g., classi cation accuracy) may di er across datasets, we will draw common observations from the results obtained based on these three datasets. e observations will provide useful guidance for the adopters of fMTD to validate their customized fMTD designs in speci c applications.
Measurement Results
In this section, we conduct measurements to investigate the responses of multiple new models to adversarial examples constructed based on the base model that is di erent from the new models.
Adversarial examples.
We use the se ings described in §3.1 to train a base model for each dataset. en, we use the C&W approach described in §2.1 to generate adversarial examples based on the base model. Speci cally, for each dataset, we select a clean test sample in each class as the basis for constructing the targeted adversarial examples whose targeted labels are the remaining classes. For instance, as MNIST has 10 classes, a total of 10 × 9 = 90 targeted adversarial examples will be generated. To generate non-targeted adversarial examples for each dataset, we randomly select 100 test samples as the bases for the construction by following the procedure described in §2.1. e C&W's adversarial examples are highly e ective -all adversarial examples that we generate are e ective against the base model.
As described in §2.1, the κ is an important parameter of the C&W's approach that controls the trade-o between the e ectiveness of the a ack and the distortion introduced. We vary κ from 0 to 95. e rst image column of Table 3 shows three clean examples from MNIST. e rest image columns show a number of Ground truth label targeted adversarial examples constructed with three se ings of κ. For instance, all images in the second column will be wrongly classi ed by the base model as '2'. We can see that with κ = 0, the perturbations introduced by the a ack are almost imperceptible to human eyes without referring to the clean examples. With κ = 45, there are clear distortions. With κ = 95, the perturbations may completely erase the gure shapes or create random shapes.
In the rest of this paper, for the sake of a ack stealthiness to human, we adopt κ = 0 unless otherwise speci ed. To con rm the e ectiveness of the adversarial examples with κ = 0, we conduct an extended experiment with 1,000 targeted adversarial examples of κ = 0 for MNIST (900 of them are based on 2 -norm, whereas the remaining are based on 0 -and ∞ -norm due to the slowness in generation). All these 1,000 adversarial examples are e ective against the base model.
Transferability of adversarial examples.
In this set of measurements, for each dataset, we train a new model that has the same architecture as the base model. en, we measure the a ack success rate (ASR) of the adversarial examples on the new model. An adversarial example is successful if the deep model yields a wrong label. e ASR characterizes the transferability of the adversarial examples to a model di ering from the one used for their construction. Table 4 shows the ASR for the three datasets. We can see that the adversarial examples constructed using the base model can still mislead the new model with probabilities from 7% to 17%. is suggests that the adversarial examples have some transferability across di erent deep models with the same architecture.
We also evaluate the transferability of the adversarial examples constructed with di erent κ se ings. We use the Euclidean distance between the adversarial example x and its corresponding clean example x to characterize the distortion caused by the adversarial perturbation. A larger κ will result in a larger distortion and thus less stealthiness of the a ack to human. Fig. 1 shows the ASR versus distortion for CIFAR-10. We can see that the ASR increases with the distortion. is shows the trade-o between the a ack's transferability and stealthiness to human. 2 , and ∞ norms) and 300 non-targeted adversarial examples (i.e., 100 examples based on each of the three norms). For each of the three datasets, we independently train 20 new models. We denote by D the number of distinct outputs of the 20 models given an adversarial example. Fig. 2 shows the histogram of D. From the gure, the probability that D is greater than one is 51%. is means that, by simply checking the consistency of the 20 models' outputs, we can detect half of the adversarial example a acks. e probability that D = 1 (i.e., all 20 new models give the same output) is 49%. Moreover, 99.5% of the adversarial examples that result in D = 1 fail to mislead any new model. is result suggests that, even if an adversarial example a ack cannot be detected by checking the consistency of the 20 models' outputs, it will be thwarted automatically with a high probability.
We now use an example to illustrate whether an adversarial example resulting in D > 1 can be thwarted. Fig. 3 shows the histogram of the 20 new models' outputs given a targeted CIFAR-10 adversarial example with a ground truth label of 1 and a target label of 0. We can see that most new models yield the ground truth label and only a few models yield labels rather than the a ack's target label. is shows that the wrong outputs of the new models tend to be unpredictable, rather than the a ack's target label. It also suggests that a voting from the distinct outputs of the new models based on a majority rule can thwart the a ack.
3.2.4
Retraining perturbed base model. e results in §3.2.3 suggest that an ensemble of multiple new models is promising for detecting and thwarting adversarial example a acks. However, the training of the new models may incur signi cant computation overhead. In this section, we investigate a retraining approach. Speci cally, we add perturbations to the well trained base model and use the result as the starting point of a retraining process to generate a new model. e model perturbation is as follows. For arXiv preprint, 2019, arXiv n Song, Zhenyu Yan, and Rui Tan each parameter matrix M of the base model, we add an independent perturbation to each element in M. e perturbation is drawn randomly and uniformly from [w · min(M), w · max(M)], where min(M) and max(M) represent the smallest and largest elements of M, respectively, and w controls the intensity of the perturbation. e system stops the retraining process if the validation accuracy stops increasing for ve consecutive epochs. en, the model in the retraining epoch that gives the highest validation accuracy is yielded as a new model. Table 5 shows the number of epochs for retraining a new model versus the intensity of the perturbation. We can see that the number of epochs increases with the perturbation intensity. As a comparison, when a new model is trained from scratch with the same stopping criterion, the number of epochs can be up to 4x higher than that with w = 0.1.
We also measure the time for retraining 20 new models for GT-SRB from perturbed versions of the base model on the NVIDIA Jetson computing board. It takes about 45 minutes.
DESIGN OF FMTD
e measurement results in §3 suggest an MTD design to counteract adversarial examples. In brief, multiple fork models can be generated dynamically by retraining independently perturbed versions of the base model. A consistency check on the fork models' outputs can detect whether the input is an adversarial example; the majority of their outputs can be yielded as the nal classi cation result to thwart the adversarial example a ack if present.
In this section, we will formally present the system and threat models ( §4.1), the design of fMTD that operates autonomously or admits human's input on the detection of an a ack ( §4.2), and the metrics characterizing the performance of fMTD ( §4.3). e designed fMTD approaches will be extensively evaluated in §5 in terms of these performance metrics.
System and reat Models
Consider an embedded visual sensing system ("the system" for short), which can execute the inference and the training of the used deep model. In this paper, we focus on a single image classi cation task. Image classi cation is a basic building block of many visual sensing systems.
e classi cation results can be used to direct the system's actuation. We assume that the system has a well factory-designed model that gives certi ed accuracy on clean examples and speci ed adversarial examples. e system also has a training dataset that can be used to train a new deep model locally that achieves a satisfactory classi cation accuracy as that given by the factory model. Moreover, we make the following two notes regarding the connection of this paper's focus of image classi cation with the overall visual sensing system in real-world applications.
First, the input to the image classi er may be a cropped area of the original image captured by a camera that contains the object of interest (e.g., the road sign). e cropping can be achieved based on object detection and image segmentation that have received extensive study in computer vision literature [48] . In this paper, we focus on addressing the adversarial example a acks on the classi cation task that takes the cropped image as the input. We assume that the object detection and image segmentation work normally. If adversarial example a acks against object detection and image segmentation exist, a separate study will be needed.
Second, some visual sensing systems process a stream of image frames by classifying the individual frames independently and then fusing the classi cation results over time to yield a nal result [28, 66] . In this paper, we focus on the classi cation of a single image.
e a ack-proof classi cation of individual frames will ensure the robustness of the temporal fusion of the classi cation results. Some other visual sensing systems may take a sequence of image frames as a one-shot input to the deep model [8, 17] . Our MTD approach is also applicable in this se ing, since its design does not require speci c structure of the deep model's input.
We assume that the a ackers cannot corrupt the system. Given that the factory model is static, we assume that the a ackers can acquire it via memory extraction, data ex ltration a ack, or insiders (e.g., unsatis ed or socially engineered employees). We also assume that the a ackers can acquire the training dataset on the system, since the dataset is also a static factory se ing. We assume that the a ackers can construct stealthy targeted or non-targeted adversarial examples with a white-box approach (e.g., the C&W approach [12] ) based on the factory model or any deep model trained by the a ackers using the dataset. Since the focus of this paper is to develop a defense approach, it is bene cial to conservatively consider strong a ackers who can launch white-box a acks. is well conforms to Kerckho s's principle.
We assume that the system can generate random numbers locally at run time that cannot be acquired by the a ackers, although the a ackers can know the probabilistic distributions of these random numbers. Truly random number generation can be costly and dicult. Various secure pseudo-random number generation methods can be used instead to achieve practical con dentiality from the a ackers. e pseudo-random numbers will be used to perturb the base model and generate fork models. As such, the a ackers cannot acquire the exact fork models.
Finally, we assume that the a ackers can deploy the adversarial examples, e.g., to paste adversarial paper stickers on road signs. Fig. 4 overviews the work ow of fMTD. We consider two operating modes of fMTD: autonomous and human-in-the-loop. Both modes have the following three components.
fMTD Work Flow

Fork models generation.
To "move the target", the system generates new deep models locally for the image classi cation task. Speci cally, we adopt the approach described in §3.2.4 to perturb the base model with a speci ed intensity level w and retrain the In the autonomous mode, the attack thwarting module is executed regardless of the attack detection result. In the human-in-the-loop mode, the attack thwarting module is executed only when the attack detection gives a positive detection result.
perturbed model using the training data to generate a fork model. e retraining completes when the validation accuracy meets a certain criterion. Using the above procedure, a total of N fork models are generated independently. We now discuss several issues.
From our evaluation results in §5, a larger se ing of N in general leads to be er performance in counteracting the adversarial example a ack. erefore, the largest se ing subject to the computation resource constraints and run-time inference timeliness requirements can be adopted. In §6, we will investigate the run-time overhead of the fork models.
e fork models generation can be performed right a er receiving each new release of the factory-designed model from the system manufacturer. For example, as measured in §3.2.4, generating 20 fork models for road sign recognition requires 45 minutes only. To further improve the system's security, the fork models generation can also be performed periodically or continuously whenever the computing unit of the system is idle. For instance, an electric car can perform the generation when it is charging during nights. A newly generated fork model can replace the oldest one among the N fork models.
Since the fork model is retrained from a perturbed version of the base model, the fork model may converge to the base model. However, as the stochastic gradient descent used in the training also incorporates randomness and a deep model o en has a large degree of freedom, with a su cient perturbation intensity level w, the fork model is most unlikely identical to the base model. From a rigorous perspective of information security, the a ackers still have a certain amount of information about the fork model since they have the base model and can know the perturbation and retraining mechanisms.
us, the ensemble of the fork models should be viewed as a quasi-secret of the system only. Nevertheless, MTD is not meant for perfect security, but for signi cantly increased barriers for the a ackers to launch e ective a acks.
A ack detection.
An input is sent to all fork models for classi cation. From the observations in §3.2.3, we can check the consistency of the outputs of all the fork models to detect whether the input is an adversarial example. If more than T × 100% of the outputs are the same, the input is detected as a clean example; otherwise, it is detected as an adversarial example. Noted that T is a threshold that can be con gured to achieve various satisfactory trade-o s. We will evaluate the impact of T on the performance of the system and discuss its se ing in §5.
A ack thwarting.
A ack thwarting aims to give the ground truth label of an adversarial example. From the observations in §3.2.3, we apply the majority rule to thwart the adversarial example a ack. Speci cally, the most frequent label among the N fork models' outputs is yielded as the nal result.
In the autonomous mode, regardless of the a ack detection result, the system will execute the a ack thwarting component to generate the nal result for the autonomous actuation of the system. Di erently, in the human-in-the-loop mode, upon a detection of adversarial example, the system will ask the human operator to classify the input and use the result for the system's subsequent actuation; if no a ack is detected, the system will execute the a ack thwarting component to yield the nal classi cation result for the subsequent actuation. In this paper, we assume that the human operator will not make any classi cation error. With this assumption, our performance metrics analysis ( §4.3) and evaluation ( §5) will provide essential understanding on how the human operator's involvement owing to fMTD's a ack detection capability improves the system's safety in the presence of a acks. Moreover, since the construction of the adversarial examples follows the perturbation minimization principle to remain imperceptible to human eyes, it is also reasonable to assume that the human operator will not make a ack-induced classi cation error. Nevertheless, our performance metric analysis and evaluation can be easily extended to address human operator's certain error rates when they are non-negligible.
We study both the autonomous and human-in-the-loop modes to understand how the involvement of human a ects the system's performance in the absence and presence of adversarial example a acks. Fully autonomous safety-critical systems in complex environments (e.g., self-driving cars) are still grand challenges. For example, all existing o -the-shelf ADAS still requires the driver's supervision throughput the driving process. In this paper, we use the results of the autonomous mode as a baseline. For either the autonomous or the human-in-the-loop modes, e ective countermeasures against adversarial examples must be developed and deployed to achieve trustworthy systems with advancing autonomy.
Performance Metrics
In this section, we analyze the metrics for characterizing the performance of fMTD in the autonomous and human-in-the-loop modes. Fig. 5 illustrates the categorization of the system's detection and thwarting results. In the following, we use x to refer to a block numbered by x in Fig. 5 . In §5, we use p x to denote the probability of the event described by the block conditioned on the event described by the precedent block. We will illustrate p x shortly.
When the ground truth of the input is an adversarial example, it may be detected correctly 1 or missed 2 . us, we use p 1 and p 2 to denote the true positive and false negative rates in a ack detection. We now further discuss the two cases of true positive and false negative:
• In case of 1 , the autonomous fMTD may succeed 3 or fail 4 in thwarting the a ack; di erently, the human-inthe loop fMTD can always thwart the a ack 3 . Note that when the a ack thwarting is successful, the system will arXiv preprint, 2019, arXiv n Song, Zhenyu Yan, and Rui Tan yield the correct classi cation result; otherwise, the system will yield a wrong classi cation result.
• In case of 2 , the autonomous or human-in-the-loop fMTD may succeed 5 or fail 6 in thwarting the a ack.
e successful defense rate 13 is the sum of the probabilities for 3 and 5 . e a ack success rate 14 is the sum of the probabilities for 4 and 6 . Note that, with the autonomous fMTD, the two rates are independent of fMTD's detection performance, because the a ack thwarting component is always executed regardless of the detection result. In contrast, with the human-in-the-loop fMTD, the two rates depend on fMTD's a ack detection performance. In §5, we will evaluate the impact of the a ack detection performance on the two rates.
When the ground truth of the input is a clean example, the detector may generate a false positive 7 or a true negative 8 .
• In case of 7 , the a ack thwarting of the autonomous fMTD may yield a correct 9 or wrong 10 classi cation result; di erently, the human-in-the-loop fMTD can always give the correct classi cation result.
• In case of 8 , the a ack thwarting of the autonomous or human-in-the-loop fMTD may yield a correct 11 or wrong 12 classi cation result.
e accuracy of the system in the absence of a ack 15 is the sum of the probabilities for 9 and 11 .
For fMTD, the successful defense rate p 13 and the accuracy p 15 are the main metrics that characterize the system's performance in the presence and absence of a acks. In the autonomous mode, these two metrics are independent of the a ack detection performance. Di erently, in the human-in-the-loop mode, they are a ected by the a ack detection performance. In an extreme case, if the detector always gives positive detection results, the human will take over the classi cation task every time to give the correct results, causing lots of unnecessary burden to the human in the absence of a ack. is unnecessary burden can be characterized by the false positive rate p 7 . ere exists a trade-o between this unnecessary burden to human and the system's performance. In summary, the performance of the autonomous fMTD and human-in-the-loop fMTD can be mainly characterized by the tuples of (p 13 , p 15 ) and (p 7 , p 13 , p 15 ), respectively.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we extensively evaluate fMTD in terms of the performance metrics described in §4.3.
Evaluation Methodology and Settings
e evaluation is also based on the three datasets described in §3.1. We adopt the CNN-A and CNN-B in Table 1 and the hyperparameters in Table 2 to train the base models for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB. We follow the approach described in §3.2.1 to generate the adversarial examples. Fig. 6 shows a subset of the adversarial examples constructed by the C&W approach using the 2 -norm for GTSRB. Note that the images on the diagonal of Fig. 6 are clean examples. We can see that the adversarial perturbations are imperceptible. e fMTD has three con gurable parameters: the number of fork models N , the model perturbation intensity w, and the a ack detection threshold T . eir default se ings are: N = 20, w = 0.2, and T = 1 (i.e., the a ack detector will alarm if there is any inconsistency among the fork models' outputs). e rate that the attack thwarting module gives correct output for true negatives (p 11 ).
Results in the Absence of Attack
e deployment of the defense should not downgrade the system's sensing accuracy in the absence of a ack. is section evaluates this sensing accuracy. All clean test samples are used to measure the probabilities in the bo om part of Fig. 5 .
First, we use all the clean test samples to evaluate the false positive rate (i.e., p 7 ) of the a ack detection. Fig. 7 shows the measured p 7 versus N under various w se ings. e p 7 increases with N . is is because, with more fork models, it will be more likely that the fork models give inconsistent results. Moreover, p 7 increases with w. is is because, with a higher model perturbation level, the retrained fork models are likely more di erent and thus give di erent results to trigger the a ack detection. e p 7 for CIFAR-10 is more than 20%. Such a high p 7 is caused by the high complexity of the CIFAR-10 images. Moreover, the detector with T = 1 is very sensitive. With a smaller T , the p 7 will reduce. For instance, with T = 0.6, p 7 is around 5%-10%. e horizontal lines represent the validation accuracy of the respective base models. Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 show the rates that the a ack thwarting gives the correct output when the a ack detection yields a false positive and a true negative, respectively. ese two rates are p 9 and p 11 as illustrated in Fig. 5 . In general, both rates increase with N and w.
is suggests that with more fork models that are more distinct, the classi cation performance of the system increases. Another observation is that, p 9 is around 60%, whereas p 11 is nearly 100%.
is is because, for the clean examples that have triggered the a ack detector are not well classi able; in contrast, the clean examples that have induced all the fork models to produce consistent classi cation results can be clearly classi ed. Fig. 10 shows the accuracy of the system in the absence of a ack (i.e., p 15 ) versus N under various w se ings. e curves labeled "scratch" represent the results obtained based on new models trained from scratch, rather than fork models. We can see that training from scratch brings insigni cant (less than 2%) accuracy improvement. e horizontal lines in Fig. 10 represent the validation accuracy of the respective base models. We can see that due to the adoption of multiple deep models, the system's accuracy is improved.
is is consistent with the understanding from the decision fusion theory [67] . e results also show that larger se ings for N bring insigni cant accuracy improvement. Reasons are as follows. First, for MNIST and GTSRB, as the accuracy of a single fork model is already high, the decision fusion based on the majority rule cannot improve the accuracy much. Second, for CIFAR-10, although the accuracy of a single fork model is not high (about 80%), the high correlations among the fork models' outputs impede the e ectiveness of decision fusion. Note that, di erently, larger se ings for N will bring signi cant defense performance, which will be shown in §5.3. From Fig. 10c , the accuracy of the road sign recognition is around 97%.
e original images in GTSRB have varied resolutions. To facilitate our evaluation, we resized all the images to 32 × 32 pixels.
is low resolution contributes to the 3% error rate. With higher resolutions, this error rate can be further reduced. e main purpose of this evaluation is to show that, in the absence of a acks, fMTD can retain or slightly improve the system's accuracy obtained with the base model. Note that statistical data released by car manufacturers show that ADAS helps reduce safety incident rates [65, 69] , implying the high accuracy of ADAS's visual sensing in the absence of a acks. Lastly, we consider the human-in-the-loop fMTD. Fig. 11 shows the results based on GTSRB. Speci cally, Fig. 11a shows the false positive rate p 7 versus N under various se ings for the detection threshold T .
e p 7 decreases with T , since the a ack detector becomes less sensitive with smaller T se ings. e p 7 characterizes the overhead incurred to the human who will make the manual classi cation when the a ack detector raises an alarm. Fig. 11b shows the accuracy p 15 versus N under various T se ings. e curve labeled "auto" is the result for the autonomous fMTD. We can see that the human-in-the-loop fMTD with T = 1 outperforms the autonomous fMTD by up to 3% accuracy, bringing the accuracy close to 100%. From Fig. 11a and Fig. 11b , we can see a trade-o between the overhead incurred to and the accuracy improvement brought by the human in the loop. To be er illustrate this trade-o , Fig. 11c shows the accuracy versus the false positive rate under various model perturbation intensity se ings. Di erent points on a curve are the results obtained with di erent se ings of the a ack detection threshold T . We can clearly see that the accuracy increases with the false positive rate. In this set of results, the accuracy improvement is from the human's perfect accuracy that we assume. Intuitively, as long as the human's accuracy is higher than the autonomous fMTD, involvement of human is bene cial.
Results in the Presence of Attack
We use the targeted adversarial examples to evaluate the performance of fMTD in detecting and thwarting a acks. Fig. 12 shows the true positive rate (i.e., p 1 ) versus N under various se ings of w. For the three datasets, the p 1 increases from around 50% to more than 90% when N increases from 3 to 20. is shows that, due to the minor transferability of adversarial examples, increasing the number of fork models is very e ective in improving the a ack detection performance. For GTSRB, when w = 0.3, all a acks can be detected as long as N is greater than 3. Fig. 13 and Fig. 14 show the rates of successfully thwarting the detected a acks (i.e., p 3 ) and the missed a acks (i.e., p 5 ), respectively. In general, these rates increase with N . From the two gures, fMTD is more e ective in thwarting the missed a acks than the detected a acks. is is because, for a missed a ack, all fork models give the same and correct classi cation result. However, for the detected a acks, all fork models' results are inconsistent and there is a chance for the majority among the results is a wrong classi cation result. From Fig. 13a , MNIST has a relatively low p 3 . is is because under the same se ing of κ = 0, the MNIST adversarial examples have larger distortions. e average distortions introduced by the malicious perturbations, as de ned in §3.2.1, are 1.9 and 0.4 for MNIST and CIFAR-10, respectively. us, the strengths of the malicious perturbations applied on MNIST are higher, leading to the lower a ack thwarting rates in Fig. 13a . Fig. 15 shows the successful defense rate (i.e., p 13 ) versus N . e p 13 has an increasing trend with N . e curves labeled "scratch" represent the results obtained with new models trained from scratch rather than fork models. e fMTD achieves successful defense of 98% with w = 0.3 for CIFAR-10 and w = 0.5 for GTSRB. MNIST has relatively low success defense rates due to the relatively low rates of successfully thwarting detected a acks as shown in Fig. 13a . However, with new models trained from scratch, the success defense rates for MNIST are nearly 100%. e higher success defense rates achieved by the new models trained from scratch are due to the lower transferability of adversarial examples to such models. However, training from scratch will incur higher (up to 4x) computation overhead. us, there is a trade-o between the a ack defense performance and the training computation overhead. We will further discuss this issue in §7.
Lastly, we evaluate how the human improves the a ack thwarting performance when fMTD operates in the human-in-the-loop mode. Fig. 16 shows the results based on GTSRB. With a larger T se ing (i.e., the detector is more sensitive), the true positive rate increases, requesting more frequent manual classi cation by the human. As a result, the successful defense rate can increase to 100%, higher than that of the autonomous fMTD. Recalling the results in Fig. 11a , a larger T leads to higher false positive rates and thus higher unnecessary overhead incurred to the human. us, there exists a trade-o between the successful defense rate and the unnecessary overhead incurred to the human. To be er illustrate this trade-o , Fig. 16c shows the successful defense rate versus the false positive rate. Di erent points on a curve are the results obtained with di erent se ings of T . We can clearly see that the successful defense rate increases with the false positive rate.
Summary and Implication of Results
From §5.2 and §5.3, we have the following observations. First, in the absence of a ack, autonomous fMTD does not improve the classi cation accuracy much when the number of fork models N increases. Di erently, autonomous fMTD's successful defense rate can be substantially improved when N increases. Note that, without fMTD, the adversarial example a acks against the static base model are always successful. is clearly suggests the necessity of deploying countermeasures.
Second, there exists a trade-o between the successful defense rate and the computation overhead in generating the fork models. Speci cally, with more fork models retrained from the base model with larger model perturbation intensity (w), higher successful defense rates can be achieved. However, the retraining will have higher computation overhead as shown in Table 5 . From the results in Fig. 15 , training the new models from scratch gives near-perfect defense performance. However, it incurs computation overhead several times higher than our model forking approach.
ird, the proposed human-in-the-loop design enables the system to leverage the human's immunity to stealthy adversarial examples. e on-demand involvement of human improves the system's accuracy in the absence of a ack and the successful defense rate in the presence of a ack, with an overhead incurred to the human that is characterized by the false positive rate. From Fig. 11c and Fig. 16c for the GTSRB road sign dataset, with a false positive rate of 4%, the accuracy without a ack is more than 99% and the successful defense rate is nearly 100%. e 4% false positive rate means that, on average, the human will be asked to classify a road sign every 25 clean images of road signs that are detected by ADAS. As adversarial example a acks are rare (but critical) events, how to further reduce the false positive rate while maintaining accuracy and successful defense rate is interesting for further research.
SERIAL FMTD WITH EARLY STOPPING
In this section, we investigate the run-time overhead of an fMTD implementation on an embedded computing board with hardware acceleration for deep model execution. As many visual sensing systems need to meet real-time requirements, we also investigate how to reduce the run-time overhead of fMTD without compromising its accuracy and defense performance.
fMTD Implementation and Pro ling
6.1.1 Setup. We implement our fMTD approach using TensorFlow and deploy it on an NVIDIA Jetson AGX Xavier [47] . Jetson is an embedded computing board launched in December 2018 and designed for running deep neural networks in applications of automative, manufacturing, retail, and etc. A Jetson board sizes 10.5 × 10.5 cm 2 and weighs 280 grams including its thermal transfer plate. It is equipped with an octal-core ARM CPU, a 512-core Volta GPU with 64 Tensor Cores, and 16GB LPDDR4X memory. It runs the Linux4Tegra operating system (version R32.1). e power consumption of Jetson can be con gured to be 10 W, 15 W, and 30 W. In our experiments, we con gure it to run at 30 W.
Profiling.
We conduct a set of pro ling experiments to compare two possible execution modes of fMTD, i.e., parallel and serial. In most deep learning frameworks, the training and testing samples are fed to the deep model in batches. For instance, for ADAS, the road signs segmented from a sequence of frames captured by the camera can form a batch to be fed to the deep model. Our pro ling experiments also follow the same batch manner to feed the input samples to the fork models. Speci cally, in the parallel mode, a batch of input samples are fed to all fork models simultaneously and all fork models are executed in parallel. is is achieved by the parallel models feature of Keras that is a neural network library running on top of TensorFlow. In the serial mode, a batch of input samples are fed to each of the fork models in serial, i.e., the next model is not executed until the completion of the previous one.
We use GTSRB test samples to compare the inference times of the fMTD in the parallel and serial modes. We vary the se ings of the batch size and the number of models. Under each se ing, we run fMTD in each mode for 100 times. Fig. 17a shows the persample inference time of fMTD with 20 fork models versus the batch size. Each error bar under a batch size se ing represents the average, the 5th percentile, and the 95th percentile of the measured inference times. We can see that the per-sample inference time decreases with the batch size but becomes at when the batch size is large.
is is because that for a larger batch, TensorFlow can process more samples concurrently. However, with too large batch size se ings, the concurrency becomes saturated due to the exhaustion of GPU resources. e per-sample inference time of the serial fMTD is longer than that of the parallel fMTD. is is because that Keras will try to use all GPU resources to run as many as possible fork models concurrently. us, the nite GPU resources will result in a bounded ratio between the inference times of the parallel and serial modes. Fig. 17b shows this ratio versus the batch size. We can see that the ratio decreases from 1.45 to 1.25 and becomes at. Reason of the decrease is, with larger batch sizes, the parallel mode has less opportunity to really execute the fork models concurrently. is limited ratio suggests that Jetson's GPU resources are still constrained (compared with server platforms).
us, on resource-constrained embedded platforms with certain hardware acceleration for deep models, the parallel execution of multiple fork models will not reduce the inference time much. Fig. 18a shows the per-sample per-model inference time versus the number of fork models N . For serial fMTD, the per-sample per-model inference time is independent of N . is result is natural. Di erently, for parallel fMTD, it decreases with N . Fig. 18b shows the ratio between the two modes' inference times versus N , which increases from about 1 to 1.3. As discussed earlier, because Keras tries to run as many as possible models concurrently, the fMTD with more fork models will be more advantageous in per-model inference time, but will become saturated eventually.
Serial fMTD with Early Stopping
6.2.1 Design. From the results in §6.1, due to the hardware resources constraint, the parallel execution of the fork models does not bring much improvement in terms of inference time. In contrast, the serial execution mode admits early stopping when there is su cient con dence about the fused result.
is is inspired by the serial decision fusion that can reduce the number of decisions needed while maintaining the same event detection performance [53] . Algorithm 1 shows the pseudocode of the serial fusion process with early stopping. Note that, in Line 1, a subset of three models is the minimum se ing enabling the majority-based decision fusion. In Line 3, the T s is a con gurable a ack detection threshold. We will assess its impact on the serial fMTD's performance shortly. Depending on the operating mode of the system (i.e., autonomous or human-in-the-loop), the classi cation result of Algorithm 1 is sent to actuation subsystems or the human is requested to perform classi cation if the input is detected as an adversarial example.
Algorithm 1 Serial fusion with early stopping
Given: set of fork models F , input x 1: randomly select 3 models from F and use them to classify x 2: loop 3:
if more than T s × 100% of the existing classi cation results are the same then 4:
x is detected clean and break the loop 5: else if all models in F have been selected then 6: x is detected adversarial and break the loop 7: end if 8: from F randomly select a model that has not been selected before and use it to classify x 9: end loop 10: return (1) a ack detection result and (2) the majority of the existing classi cation results
Evaluation.
In our experiments, we set N = 20 and vary the serial detection threshold T s from 0.5 to 1. Fig. 19a shows the number of folk models used in serial fMTD. For instance, when T s ≤ 60% and T s = 100%, only three models are used in 95% and 68% of all the tests, respectively. When T s = 50% and T s = 100%, 3.08 and 8.37 models are used on average, respectively. e inference times of serial fMTD with T s = 50% and T s = 100% are just about 20% and 50% of that of parallel fMTD executing all 20 models. en, we evaluate the impact of the early stopping on the sensing and defense performance. Fig. 19b shows the accuracy (p 15 ) versus the false positive rate (p 7 ). Di erent points on a curve are results under di erent T s se ings from 0.5 to 1. We can see that, compared with executing all fork models, the early stopping results in li le accuracy drop (about 0.1%). Fig. 19c shows the successful defense rate (p 13 ) versus the false positive rate (p 7 ). Di erent points on a curve are results under di erent T s se ings from 0.5 to 1. We can see that, with a false positive rate of 4%, the successful defense rate drops 2.2% only. e above results show that the early stopping can signi cantly reduce the run-time inference time, with li le compromise of accuracy and defense performance. e results for MNIST and CIFAR-10 are similar; we omit them here due to space constraint.
DISCUSSION
e fMTD trains the fork models from perturbed base model. e results in Fig. 15 show that if the new models are trained from scratch, near-perfect defense rates can be achieved. In practice, the factory models can be more sophisticated than the ones used in this paper. e training from scratch may require massive training data and long training time for the embedded system. In addition, the factory models may contain extensive manual tuning by experts. e fMTD's approach of training from perturbed versions of the factory model is more credible to retain the desirable manual tuning. How to retain speci c manually tuned features of the factory model in the fork models is interesting to future research.
It is also viable for the manufacturer to generate multiple deep models from the base model for each product independently. If the models remain static a er the release of the products, this approach forms a weak form of MTD. e ability of in situ self-updating of the models is desirable.
CONCLUSION
is paper presented a fork moving target defense (fMTD) approach for deep learning-based image classi cation on embedded platforms against the recently discovered adversarial example a acks. We extensively evaluated the performance of fMTD in the absence and presence of a acks. Based on the pro ling results of fMTD on NVIDIA Jetson, we also proposed a serial fMTD with early stopping to reduce the inference time.
e results in this paper provide useful guidelines for integrating fMTD to the current embedded deep visual sensing systems to improve their security.
